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spectrum disorder
Jill Boucher and Sophie Anns
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Abstract
Background and aims: The ‘dual-systems’ model of language acquisition has been used by Ullman et al. to explain
patterns of strength and weakness in the language of higher-functioning people with autism spectrum disorder.
Specifically, intact declarative/explicit learning is argued to compensate for a deficit in non-declarative/implicit procedural
learning, constituting an example of the so-called see-saw effect. Ullman and Pullman extended their argument concern-
ing a see-saw effect on language in autism spectrum disorder to cover other perceived anomalies of behaviour, including
impaired acquisition of social skills. The aim of this paper is to present a critique of Ullman et al.’s claims and to propose
an alternative model of links between memory systems and language in autism spectrum disorder.
Main contribution: We argue that a four-system model of learning, in which intact semantic and procedural memory
are used to compensate for weaknesses in episodic memory and perceptual learning, can better explain patterns of
language ability across the autistic spectrum. We also argue that attempts to generalise the ‘impaired implicit learning/
spared declarative learning’ theory to other behaviours in autism spectrum disorder are unsustainable.
Conclusions: Clinically significant language impairments in autism spectrum disorder are under-researched, despite
their impact on everyday functioning and quality of life. The relative paucity of research findings in this area lays it open to
speculative interpretation which may be misleading.
Implications: More research is needed into links between memory/learning systems and language impairments across
the spectrum. Improved understanding should inform therapeutic intervention and contribute to investigation of the
causes of language impairment in autism spectrum disorder with potential implications for prevention.
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Introduction
According to the dual-systems model of language
acquisition, as argued for by Ullman (2001, 2004), cer-
tain facets of language, notably knowledge of the items
and combinatorial rules of phonology and grammar,
are acquired unconsciously and are not generally
accessible to verbal report, i.e. they are ‘implicit’ and
‘non-declarative’. By contrast, lexical-semantic know-
ledge is available to conscious thought and verbal
report, i.e. it is ‘explicit’ and ‘declarative’.
Based on this model, Ullman et al. have argued that
structural language in people with autism spectrum dis-
order (ASD) reﬂects impaired non-declarative learning
in combination with increased reliance on intact
declarative learning (Walenski, Mostofsky, Gidley-
Larson, & Ullman, 2008; Walenski, Mostofsky, &
Ullman, 2014; Walenski, Tager-Flusberg, & Ullman,
2006). Ullman and Pullman (2015) have subsequently
argued that declarative learning is used to compensate
for deﬁciencies in non-declarative learning of various
kinds in a number of neurodevelopmental and mental
health disorders, including ASD, referring to this as a
‘see-saw eﬀect’.
Ullman’s group has a well-earned reputation for
scholarship in the ﬁeld of neuropsychology, and their
views are inﬂuential. Their interpretations of linguistic
and other anomalies of learning in ASD are, however,
in our opinion inconsistent with available evidence.
In this paper, we ﬁrst say why we think that their
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views are untenable, critiquing each of four publica-
tions (two theoretical, two empirical) by this group in
which their interpretations of anomalous learning in
ASD are propounded. In the second part of the
paper, we outline a more diﬀerentiated four-system
model of language acquisition. We also summarise evi-
dence relating to the intactness or otherwise of each of
these learning systems in ASD, and suggest how the
mixture of strengths and weaknesses links to language
proﬁles across the spectrum. Finally, we utilise our pre-
ferred model of learning systems to oﬀer a reinterpret-
ation of ﬁndings from the two empirical papers
on language in ASD published by Ullman’s group.
We also propose a reformulation of the see-saw eﬀect
across language and other behaviours in ASD, using
our preferred four-system model.
There are, of course, very many alternative models
of normal language development (see Ambridge &
Lieven, 2011, for discussion of key models). There is
also a multiplicity of factors involved in language
acquisition, other than the selective cognitive compe-
tences considered here. However, neither alternative
models nor other contributory factors will be con-
sidered in this paper, the limited aims of which are
ﬁrst to oﬀer a critique of Ullman et al.’s claims regard-
ing ASD; and second to indicate how a more nuanced
version of their dual-route model might provide a more
accurate analysis of some linguistic anomalies in the
case of autism.
The dual-systems model of language
acquisition as applied to ASD by
Ullman et al.
In this section, Ullman et al.’s four publications relating
to language acquisition and learning in ASD are sum-
marised, and our reasons for questioning the views
expressed are stated.
Walenski, Tager-Flusberg and Ullman (2006)
Summary. In this theoretical paper, Walenski et al.
argued that phonological and grammatical abilities
tend to be impaired in ASD, whereas lexical-semantic
knowledge is relatively unimpaired. Utilising the dual-
systems model of language acquisition, Walenski et al.
explained this uneven language proﬁle in terms of a
deﬁcit in unconscious (‘implicit’/‘non-declarative’)
learning, in combination with relatively spared con-
scious (‘explicit’/‘declarative’) learning ability. More
speciﬁcally, they identiﬁed the deﬁcit of unconscious
learning with impaired procedural memory, citing the
‘procedural deﬁcit hypothesis’ (PDH) as proposed by
Mostofsky, Goldberg, Landa and Denkla (2000) as an
explanation of motor impairments in ASD. Walenski
et al. (2006) further proposed that intact declarative
learning would be utilised to compensate for impaired
procedural learning in what Ullman (2004) had referred
to as a ‘see-saw eﬀect’.
Critique. The claim that phonology and grammar
are more impaired than lexical-semantic knowledge in
ASD is inconsistent with evidence from most empirical
studies. Speciﬁcally, grammatical abilities (syntax and
morphosyntax) are largely if not entirely unimpaired in
school-age children and adults with higher-functioning
ASD1 (HF-ASD) (see reviews by Boucher, 2012; Kim,
Paul, Tager-Flusberg & Lord, 2014; Williams, Botting
& Boucher, 2008). Notably, Kim et al. conclude that
‘syntactic development is more similar than dissimilar
to normal development’ (i.e. generally commensurate
with developmental age) across the spectrum, suggest-
ing that procedural memory is unimpaired not only in
individuals with HF-ASD but also in those who are less
able. Two caveats are relevant, however.
First, it is important to point out that intact grammar
may only be observed in individuals with HF-ASD once
they have reached junior school age (i.e. from c. age 7.0
years). During the preschool/infant school years,
children with HF-ASD frequently have signiﬁcant gram-
matical impairments, probably related to late language
onset (Eigsti, Bennetto, & Dadlani, 2007; Rapin & Dunn,
2003; Rapin, Dunn, Allen, Stevens, & Fein, 2009).
Second, some subtle syntactic anomalies have been
observed in individuals with HF-ASD, especially in
those whose language normalised following initial
delay (Durrleman, Hippolyte, Zuﬀerey, Iglesias &
Hadjikhani, 2015). These anomalies may result indir-
ectly from pragmatic or prosodic impairments, rather
than from a procedural learning impairment (Pre´vost,
Tuller, Barthez, Malvy, & Bonnet-Brilhaut, 2017; Terzi,
Marinis, & Francis, 2016). However, a study by
Perovic, Modyanova and Wexler (2013) demonstrated
impaired comprehension of reﬂexive pronouns not
easily explained in terms of impaired pragmatics or
prosody. Perovic et al.’s groups were small, and the
authors comment that further studies with larger
groups are needed. However, even if their ﬁndings
were conﬁrmed, it is likely – given the weight of evi-
dence of mental-age-appropriate syntactic development
in ASD – that this (or other subtle syntactic impair-
ments that may be demonstrated) are explicable in
terms of one or other of the multiple
factors contributing to the acquisition of syntax,
rather than in terms of any generalised deﬁcit in implicit
learning. Additional factors contributing to syntactic
development include hearing acuity, attentional factors,
short-term memory, spatial and temporal processing,
and concepts of self and other, to name just a few.
Regarding phonology, in particular phonotactics,
i.e. the acquisition and use of the rules and regularities
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governing combinations of phonemes, there is
very little evidence relating to ASD. Two detailed stu-
dies of speech production by individuals with HF-ASD,
including many with a diagnosis of Asperger syndrome,
reported high rates of phonemic abnormalities
which might constitute evidence of phonotactic impair-
ment (Cleland, Gibbon, Peppe, O’Hare, & Rutherford,
2010; Shriberg, Paul, McSweeny, Klin, & Cohen,
2001). However, the data reported are more read-
ily interpreted in terms of impaired phoneme acquisi-
tion, as is suggested in a later section of the present
paper.
Regarding Walenski et al.’s (2006) explanation of
perceived grammatical impairments in ASD, the PDH
was – as noted above – ﬁrst proposed as an explanation
of motor impairments in autism (Mostofsky et al.,
2000; see also Romero-Munguı´a 2008). However,
more recent studies of motor learning do not support
this explanation. On the contrary, studies by Barnes
et al. (2008), Brown, Aczel, Jime´nez, Kaufman and
Grant (2010), Nemeth et al. (2010) and Travers,
Klinger, Mussey and Klinger (2010) and a meta-analy-
sis of such studies by Foti, De Crescenzo, Vivanti,
Menghini and Vicari (2015) show that the ability to
learn sequences of motor behaviour is completely
normal in HF-ASD. Moreover, in recent authoritative
reviews of studies delineating and attempting to explain
patterns of motor ability and disability in ASD, neither
Gowen and Hamilton (2013) nor Bodison and
Mostofsky (2014) refer to the PDH.
In their study cited above, Brown et al. (2010) did
not only assess procedural learning of motor sequences
but they also assessed procedural memory using tests of
artiﬁcial grammar learning and probabilistic learning.
There were no impairments in the ASD group on any of
these tasks relative to appropriately matched compari-
son groups. Moreover, Klinger, Klinger and Pohlig’s
(2006) claim that lack of impairment on implicit pro-
cedural learning tasks in HF-ASD reﬂects high intelli-
gence and compensatory use of explicit rule learning
was assessed by Brown et al. and disconﬁrmed.
So impressed were Nemeth et al. (2010) by the perform-
ance of their ASD group over a variety of implicit
learning tasks that they entitled the paper reporting
their ﬁndings: ‘Learning in autism: Implicitly superb’.
This conclusion has received recent support from
two further meta-analyses. Obeid, Brooks, Powers,
Gillespie-Lynch and Lum (2016) examined ﬁndings on
six statistical learning tasks: serial reaction time, artiﬁ-
cial grammar learning, contextual cueing, speech
stream, observational learning and probabilistic classi-
ﬁcation. Performance by individuals with ASD on all
these tasks was superior to that of individuals with
speciﬁc language impairment (SLI), and unimpaired
relative to other comparison groups. Clark and Lum
(2017) carried out a meta-analysis of performance on
the serial reaction time task across six disorders: ASD,
developmental coordination disorder, dyslexia,
Parkinson’s disease, schizophrenia and SLI. Procedural
learning was spared in ASD in striking contrast to the
ﬁve other disorders where there were clear impairments.
Finally, the conclusion from research studies that
procedural learning is a notable strength in people
with ASD across the spectrum is reinforced by obser-
vation of everyday behaviour. This is marked by an
unusual degree of reliance on entrenched associations,
habits and routines such as are generally acquired
implicitly through experience, rather than by explicit
learning (Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Ullman, 2004).
Walenski, Mostofsky, Gidley-Larson and
Ullman (2008)
Summary. In this short empirical paper, Walenski et al.
reported enhanced (speeded) picture-naming in boys
with HF-ASD when compared to typically developing
(TD) boys. However, speeded naming only occurred
on low-frequency words. Moreover, there were no
diﬀerences in naming speed when HF-ASD boys were
compared with TD girls.
Walenski et al. explained the combination of
enhanced speed of naming of low-frequency words
with normal speed of naming high-frequency words in
terms of an argument proposed by Levelt (2001) and
Levelt, Roelofs and Meyer (1999). Levelt et al. argued
that diﬀerences in word-ﬁnding speed for high- and
low-frequency words derive from a sub-stage of lexical,
i.e. declarative, processing. Using this argument,
Walenski et al. suggested that the ASD boys’ habitual
reliance on declarative learning systems to compensate
for ‘impaired procedural memory’ (the so-called see-
saw eﬀect) would enhance naming speed selectively
for low-frequency words. Walenski et al. further
argued that the lack of a diﬀerence between the boys
with HF-ASD and TD girls was consistent with the
known female advantage, relative to males, in lexical
and declarative memory (Ullman, 2004; Ullman et al.,
2007).
Critique. The substantial body of evidence of intact
procedural learning in ASD, cited above, argues conclu-
sively against Walenski et al.’s assumption of impaired
procedural learning, undermining their interpretation of
the ﬁndings. And if procedural learning is unimpaired,
as all the available evidence suggests, then one needs to
ask what declarative memory is compensating for?
Walenski, Mostofsky and Ullman (2014)
Summary. In this empirical paper, Walenski et al.
reported speeded grammatical processing in high-
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functioning boys with ASD. Speciﬁcally, the boys with
HF-ASD were signiﬁcantly faster than TD boys of the
same age and verbal ability at producing regular, rule-
governed past tenses of English verbs, e.g. ‘slipped’ as the
past tense of ‘slip’. They were also faster when asked to
generate a regular, rule-governed past tense of a nonsense
word, e.g. ‘plimmed’ as the past tense of ‘plim’. However,
they were no faster than their TD peers at producing
irregular past tense forms of English verbs, e.g. ‘brought’
as the past tense of ‘bring’. Nor were they faster when
generating irregular past tense forms of nonsense words,
e.g. ‘splam’ as the past tense of ‘splim’. Accuracy, i.e. the
correctness or appropriacy, of the responses generated
did not diﬀer across the two groups.
Walenski et al. (2014) interpreted these ﬁndings in terms
of normal declarative memory in HF-ASD underlying
intact acquisition of irregular past tense verb forms, com-
binedwith an impairment of procedural learningmanifest-
ing in ‘unsuppressed and therefore speeded’ grammatical
processing of the regular past tense verb form.
Critique. Walenski et al.’s suggestion that a proced-
ural memory deﬁcit could lead to unsuppressed and
therefore speeded grammatical processing in HF-ASD
is undermined by the substantial evidence of intact pro-
cedural processing in ASD across the spectrum, as sum-
marised earlier. Moreover, the suggestion that a
procedural learning deﬁcit could lead to unimpaired
but speeded grammatical processing is counter-intui-
tive. In support of their suggestion, Walenski et al.
cite evidence of speeded grammatical processing in
Tourette’s Syndrome (Walenski, Mostofsky, &
Ullman, 2007). However, in their Tourette’s partici-
pants speeded grammatical processing occurred in the
absence of a procedural memory deﬁcit, consistent with
what might be intuitively expected.
Walenski et al. are obviously aware that their pro-
cedural deﬁcit explanation of unimpaired but speeded
grammatical processing in HF-ASD is questionable
because they allow that their ﬁndings might reﬂect
‘enhanced’ rather than defective procedural learning.
However, they dismiss this possibility, stating ‘we are
not aware of any independent evidence of enhanced
procedural learning in autism’. Whilst we agree that
there is no evidence of superior procedural learning in
ASD, there is a wealth of evidence of intact procedural
learning (as cited above). And later in this paper we
argue for a pattern of learning strengths and weaknesses
in HF-ASD such as might underlie enhanced reliance on,
and hence practice in using, this form of learning, con-
sistent with speeded grammatical processing.
Ullman and Pullman (2015)
Summary. Ullman and Pullman (2015) propose that a
see-saw eﬀect occurs in people with ASD in which
declarative learning is used to compensate for deﬁcien-
cies in non-declarative learning across a range of behav-
iours, not exclusively linguistic. In this paper, Ullman
and Pullman speciﬁcally do not argue for a deﬁcit in
procedural learning, but refer instead to deﬁciencies
in ‘implicit’ learning. Ullman and Pullman are also
cautious in the claims they make concerning the intact-
ness of declarative learning. Thus, they conclude from
available evidence that individuals with HF-ASD have
‘intact memory for facts, percepts, and associations,
with mild episodic memory impairments’ (see Gaigg,
Bowler & Gardiner, 2014 for a particularly clear dem-
onstration of the dissociation). They also accept (citing
evidence tabulated in the review of memory abilities in
ASD by Boucher, Mayes & Bigham, 2012) that declara-
tive memory in lower-functioning people with ASD
(LF-ASD)2 is probably more impaired than in people
with HF-ASD.
Having established that declarative learning is pre-
dominantly intact – at least in HF-ASD – Ullman and
Pullman cite behavioural evidence in support of their
claim that declarative learning is used to compensate
for certain behavioural impairments. In particular, they
cite (i) the use of formulaic language ‘to compensate for
linguistic and social deﬁcits’; (ii) reliance on explicitly
memorised rules, scripts and event schemas to compen-
sate for deﬁcits in the implicit (unconscious) acquisition
of social behaviours; (iii) the use of explicit (conscious)
problem-solving abilities to ‘hack out’ solutions to tests
of theory of mind; (iv) the use of consciously formu-
lated rules to establish categories and concepts such as
are typically acquired unconsciously/implicitly; and (v)
the reliance of therapeutic interventions on explicit
teaching methods. References to the behavioural
evidence cited by Ullman and Pullman can be found
in their paper.
In sum, although the PDH is not invoked by name in
the sections of Ullman and Pullman’s paper which
relate to ASD, impairments of implicit knowledge
and learning are identiﬁed as driving the need to
compensate by utilising declarative learning.
Critique. Abandonment of the PDH is to be wel-
comed in view of the overwhelming evidence against
it. However, use of the term ‘implicit’ to replace ‘pro-
cedural’ does not greatly help Ullman and Pullman’s
argument for a ‘spared declarative-impaired non-
declarative/implicit’ see-saw eﬀect in the case of ASD.
In particular, deﬁcits in the unconscious/implicit
acquisition of social behaviours and capacities (points
(ii) and (iii) above) are likely to result from primary
social deﬁcits, rather than from impaired implicit learn-
ing. Evidence of unimpaired – indeed ‘superb’ – implicit
learning across a range of tasks has been referred to
above (Brown et al., 2010, and Nemeth et al., 2010;
also the reviews by Foti et al., 2015; Obeid, Brooks,
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Powers, Gillespie-Lynch & Lum, 2016; and Clark &
Lum, 2017). Obeid et al. go as far to state that the
social-communicative deﬁcits associated with ASD
cannot be explained by a deﬁcit in statistical learning.
It may be concluded, therefore, that there is no gen-
eralised impairment of implicit learning or implicit
knowledge in ASD. The selective impairments of
implicit social learning ((ii) above) and implicit social
cognition ((iii) above) are, on the other hand, readily
explained in terms of primary social impairments in
ASD (Frith, 2013; Happe´ & Frith, 2014). In their
review of atypical social development in neurodevelop-
mental disorders, Happe´ and Frith conclude that in
the case of ASD, primary social deﬁcits may include
alexithymia and impairments of agent identiﬁcation,
biological motion processing, emotion regulation and
implicit mentalising. Possible causal links between these
impairments are discussed by Happe´ and Frith, but no
conclusions drawn.3
Similarly, impaired and anomalous category forma-
tion (point (iv) above) cannot be explained by a gener-
alised impairment of implicit/non-declarative learning,
in view of evidence of unimpaired procedural learning
in ASD. On the other hand, anomalous category for-
mation is entirely consistent with well-known and
extensively researched anomalies of sensory-perceptual
processing. Sensory-perceptual anomalies, like primary
social impairments, are diagnostic of ASD (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Originally characterised
as reﬂecting ‘weak central coherence’ (Frith & Happe´,
1994) or ‘enhanced perceptual functioning’ (Mottron &
Burack, 2001), these anomalies are now thought to
comprise superior discrimination abilities in combin-
ation with impaired generalisation as ﬁrst proposed
by Plaisted, O’Riordan and Baron-Cohen (1998) and
most recently argued for by Davis and Plaisted-Grant
(2014; see also Pellicano & Burr, 2012). More is said
below concerning our preferred explanations of the
causes of impaired social learning and impaired cat-
egory formation in ASD.
These arguments do not invalidate Ullman and
Pullman’s contention that explicit forms of learning
are utilised compensatorily in the ways they suggest.
However, they do underline the need for a clear and
convincing account of exactly what deﬁcits in ASD
force an unusual degree of reliance on explicit, declara-
tive learning.
A four-system model of language
acquisition in ASD
In our own work on memory and language in ASD
(Bott, Brock, Brockdorﬀ, Boucher, & Lamberts, 2006;
Boucher, Bigham, Mayes, & Muskett, 2008; Boucher,
2012) we have generally used a model of learning systems
which subdivides both declarative and non-declarative
memory into two functionally and neuroanatomically
diﬀerentiable subsystems, as originally proposed by
Tulving (1991) (see also Schacter & Tulving, 1994).4
Thus, perceptual memory and procedural memory are
diﬀerentiable forms of non-declarative learning; and
semantic memory and episodic memory are diﬀerenti-
able forms of declarative learning. It is important to
point out, however, that although better diﬀerentiated
than the declarative/non-declarative model of learning
utilised by Walenski, Ullman et al. in their publications
relating to ASD, the four-system model is in its turn an
oversimpliﬁcation of the multiple interactive and
overlapping processes involved in individual instances
of everyday learning (Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013).
Nevertheless, the model provides a useful framework,
we believe, for understanding links between memory
and language acquisition in the case of autism.
Deﬁnitions of each of these four subsystems and
their roles in normal language acquisition are outlined
below, followed by a summary of what is known about
these forms of learning in ASD.
Non-declarative, implicit learning systems
Perceptual memory.. This non-declarative learning
system registers and brieﬂy retains ‘snapshot’ records
of single items such as a face in a crowd, a bird call, a
whiﬀ of scent (Kellman, 2002; Kellman & Garrigan,
2009). Occurring individually, such brieﬂy retained per-
cepts may inﬂuence how one feels or behaves at the
time or subsequently, although experienced below the
level of awareness. For example, in the phenomenon
known as ‘perceptual priming’ a subliminally registered
percept lowers the threshold for responding to a related
stimulus. In the phenomenon known as ‘contextual
cueing’, a subliminally registered percept may, if
re-experienced, spontaneously cue recall of an object
or event with which it originally co-occurred.
Perceptual memory contributes to language acqui-
sition primarily through its role in category and con-
cept formation. Precisely how categories and concepts
are formed and organised is complex and controver-
sial (Mareschal, Quinn, & Lea, 2010). However,
according to one inﬂuential model which has been
used in numerous tests of category formation in
ASD, the repeated experience of a particular percept
in slightly varying forms, referred to as ‘exemplars’,
underlies the unconscious formation of individualised
items of knowledge (Mayor & Plunkett, 2010). At the
core of each item is a ‘prototype’ around which a
prescribed degree of generalisability, or variation,
can occur. For example, a prototypical bicycle has
two large wheels, handlebars, a seat and pedals, but
bicycles in general instantiate multiple variations
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around this prototype. In the case of language, cat-
egory formation underlies the acquisition of concepts
underlying lexical meaning; it also underlies the acqui-
sition of ﬁrst-language phonemes.
Available evidence indicates that whereas perceptual
priming and contextual cueing are intact in people with
ASD (Bowler, Matthews, & Gardiner, 1997; Brown
et al., 2010; Renner, Klinger, & Klinger, 2000; Toichi,
2008), category formation is at best achieved anomal-
ously and/or more slowly than normal, and in some
circumstances is signiﬁcantly impaired (Bott et al.,
2006; Church et al., 2010; Froehlich et al., 2012;
Gastgeb, Dundas, Minshew, & Strauss, 2012;
Mercado & Church, 2016; Mercado et al., 2015;
Molesworth, Bowler, & Hampton, 2005; Soulie`res,
Mottron, Gigue`re, & Larochelle, 2011; Vladusich,
Olu-Lafe, Kim, Tager-Flusberg, & Grossberg, 2010).
Impaired or anomalous category formation is con-
sistent with current models of primary sensory-percep-
tual anomalies in ASD (already referred to above) – in
particular, Plaisted et al.’s (1998) ‘enhanced-
discrimination reduced-generalisation theory’ and
Pellicano’s ‘hypo-priors’ theory (Pellicano & Burr,
2012; see also Davis & Plaisted-Grant, 2014; Lawson,
Rees & Friston, 2014). These well-supported theories
converge on the conclusion that people with ASD
have enhanced sensitivity to sensory detail associated
with impaired ability to detect similarities between non-
identical exemplars of a particular category, i.e.
impaired generalisation (Church et al., 2015).
Impaired generalisation in turn results in the formation
of narrow or weakly deﬁned prototypes – what
Pellicano and Burr refer to as ‘hypo-priors’. So, for
example, a child with ASD might be exceptionally sen-
sitive to the diﬀerences between one brand of cornﬂakes
and another, but insensitive to the similarities and
therefore reluctant to eat cornﬂakes of an unfamiliar
brand.5
Anomalous category formation has clear implica-
tions for conceptual networks underlying linguistic
meaning, helping to explain why words are often
used with narrowed or idiosyncratic meaning by
people with ASD across the spectrum (Asperger,
1944/1991; Eigsti, Bennetto, & Dadlani, 2007; Fay &
Schuler, 1980; Mayes, Calhoun, & Crites, 2001). A
study of semantic priming by Kamio and Toichi
(2007) showing normal eﬀects of closely semantically
related primes but impaired eﬀects of more peripherally
related primes is also consistent with a narrowed
semantic meaning base.
Anomalous category formation may also help to
explain the subclinical phonemic anomalies in people
with ASD noted above. However, there is no research
evidence, to the best of our knowledge, relating to this
possibility.
Procedural memory.. This non-declarative learning
system involves the unconscious perception, extraction
and registration of regularities within sequences of sen-
sory-perceptual experience and is involved in condition-
ing and the acquisition of associations, habits/routines
and skills whether motor, social, cognitive or linguistic
(Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Ullman, 2004; cf also
Baron-Cohen, 2009, in which he articulates his concept
of ‘systemising’.6)
With regard to language, procedural learning sub-
serves the acquisition and use of the unconsciously
internalised rules and regularities for combining
words and word parts, i.e. syntax and morphosyntax.
It also underlies the acquisition and use of implicit
knowledge of the rules and regularities for combining
phonemes, i.e. phonotactics. As noted in a previous
section, grammar is generally mental-age appropriate
in older children and adults with ASD across the spec-
trum, consistent with other evidence of intact proced-
ural learning, as summarised earlier. Also as noted
above, minor phonemic errors in autistic speech such
as might theoretically result from impaired phonotac-
tics are more readily explained by anomalous category
formation.
Declarative, explicit learning systems
Semantic/single item memory.. This declarative memory
system subserves the acquisition of single items of
decontextualised factual information, such as the fact
that Paris is the capital city of France; that Shakespeare
wrote a play called ‘Hamlet’. It also underpins acquisi-
tion of the link between a concept or item of knowledge
with the word, or words, denoting the concept or item.
So, for example, semantic memory enables one to learn
that the word ‘Paris’ is the name for the capital city of
France; that ‘dog’ refers to an animal with four legs,
which barks and wags its tail; that the phrase ‘The sky’s
the limit’ refers to high or unstinted ambition.
The essential role of this memory system in the acqui-
sition of a meaningful vocabulary of substantive single
items or stock phrases is inherent in the term ‘semantic’
and highlighted in the term ‘lexical semantics’.
Semantic memory is most commonly assessed using
recognition tests, performance on which is largely
dependent on stimulus familiarity (Montaldi &
Mayes, 2010; Yonelinas, 2002). Numerous empirical
studies using recognition tests demonstrate conclusively
that semantic memory is unimpaired in people with
HF-ASD (see the review by by Boucher et al., 2012).
This conclusion is reinforced by clinical and anecdotal
observations of ‘encyclopaedic memory for facts’
(Wing, 1996) and by above-average performance on
the Information subtest of the Wechsler Scales by
people with HF-ASD (Koyama, Tachimori, Osada,
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Takeda, & Kurita, 2007; Spek, Scholte, & van
Berckelaer-Onnes, 2008). With regard to language,
intact semantic/single item learning is evident in the
large single-word vocabularies acquired by many individ-
uals with HF-ASD. It is also consistent with the tendency
to use formulaic language, i.e. repetitive use of stock
phrases acquired as undiﬀerentiated ‘chunks’. However,
when learning is additionally dependent on social or
emotional competences and understanding, learning
may be impaired or anomalous. Eﬀects on language
include a relative paucity of words denoting mental
states such as ‘think’, ‘believe’, ‘feel’ (Tager-Flusberg,
1995) or emotions (Hobson & Lee, 1989). Correct use
of deictic terms, which involve comparing one’s own
with another person’s perspective, is also diﬃcult to
acquire (Hobson, Garcia´-Pe´rez, & Lee, 2010).
In lower-functioning (but formally testable) individ-
uals with ASD, recognition tests tend to suggest that
semantic/single item memory is impaired (Boucher et
al., 2008; Boucher, 2012). Moreover, there is no evidence
of a notable capacity to acquire factual knowledge in a
ﬁeld of special interest, and performance on
the Information subtest of the Wechsler Scales is
commensurate with sub-average performance on the
Vocabulary and Similarities subtests, rather than
constituting a relative peak of ability (Dawson,
Soulie`res, Gernsbacher, & Mottron, 2007). We have
argued that impaired semantic memory plays a major
role in the impairments of language seen in LF-ASD
(Boucher, 2012; Mayes & Boucher, 2008). Similarities
between scores on the Information, Vocabulary and
Similarities subtests of the Wechsler scales are consistent
with this hypothesis.
Episodic/relational memory.. This declarative learning
system subserves the acquisition and recall of memories
of complex, multi-component stimuli including person-
ally experienced events. In the case of memory for a
personally experienced event, components of the
memory might include where and when the event
occurred, who one was with, how one felt at the time,
what the weather was like, what happened just before
or just after the event, and so on. In the case of complex
stimuli that do not constitute personally experienced
events, the individual components of such stimuli (e.g.
a painting of a landscape; the characters and events in a
novel) must be remembered as related to each other,
and for this reason, episodic memory is sometimes
referred to as ‘relational memory’. Because episodic
memory is generally assessed using tests of recall, it is
more dependent on processes associated with recollec-
tion, as opposed to familiarity (Montaldi & Mayes,
2010; Yonelinas, 2002).
Episodic/relational memory is important for the
enrichment of word meanings. For example, the word
‘Paris’ has enriched meaning for anyone who has
visited or lived there. Similarly, the word ‘dog’ acquires
a rich set of connotations gleaned from the varied
experiences of many diﬀerent dogs in many diﬀerent
situations. It follows that although a large vocabulary
may be acquired using semantic memory, in the absence
of intact episodic/relational memory, word meanings
will be impoverished, tending to ‘denote’ rather than
to ‘connote’ (Fay & Schuler, 1980).
There is now overwhelming evidence that episodic/
relational learning is impaired across the spectrum (for
reviews of this evidence, see Ben Shalom, 2003; Bowler,
Gaigg & Lind, 2011; Boucher et al., 2012; Lind & Bowler,
2008; Lind, Williams, Bowler & Peel, 2014; Salmond,
Adlam, Gadian & Vargha-Khadem, 2008). The combin-
ation of impaired episodic memory but intact semantic
memory would, we argue, inevitably contribute to the
narrowed, denotative quality of word meanings for
people with HF-ASD, aggravating the eﬀects of anomal-
ous category formation. An unusual degree of reliance on
semantic/single-item learning compensating for a weak-
ness in episodic/relational learning is also consistent with
the fact that whereas people with HF-ASD generally per-
form well on single-word vocabulary tests, they
perform less well on tests of higher-order language pro-
cessing (Dunn & Bates, 2005; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph,
2003). As noted by Kelley, Paul, Fein and Naigles (2006),
vocabulary tests assess knowledge of the most basic iden-
tiﬁcation function of words but do not probe conceptual
networks underlying word meanings.
Application of the four-system model
to Ullman et al.’s empirical findings,
and a reformulation of the see-saw
effect in ASD
Enhanced production of low-frequency words
in boys with HF-ASD (Walenski et al., 2008)
– A reinterpretation
The simplest explanation of enhanced (speeded) produc-
tion of low-frequency picture names by boys with
HF-ASD is that vocabulary was not matched across
groups in this study: groups were matched on full-scale
IQ, leaving open the possibility of a mismatch on
language ability. It may therefore have been the case
that the boys with HF-ASD had more advanced voca-
bularies than the TD boys. Any diﬀerence in vocabulary
knowledge would have been more likely to aﬀect speed
of naming low-frequency words as opposed to high-
frequency words. Failure to equate groups for vocabu-
lary levels could also explain why the boys with HF-ASD
were superior to TD boys but not to TD girls.
It is also relevant to note that a selective advantage
in the production of low-frequency words is consistent
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with clinical and empirical evidence of a tendency for
able people with ASD to use unusual words or phrases
(Asperger, 1944/1991; Dunn, Gomes, & Sebastian,
1996; Tantam, 1988; Volden & Lord, 1991). Thus, for
these able individuals the usual distinction between
low- and high-frequency vocabulary items may not
apply: they will perform similarly – or somewhat simi-
larly – across the two subsets of vocabulary items.
By contrast, in neurotypical groups naming speed for
lower-frequency words will drop in comparison to
naming speed for higher-frequency words as shown in
Figure 1(a) of Walenski et al.’s paper.
If, however, the groups were in fact well matched for
language (using some test other than picture identiﬁca-
tion or naming), speeded naming might alternatively be
explained in terms of a see-saw eﬀect. Unlike Walenski
et al., however, we would suggest that the eﬀect occurs
within declarative memory, with intact semantic/single-
item memory compensating for impaired episodic/rela-
tional memory. Picture-naming is, in eﬀect, a test of
the basic identiﬁcation function of words, which, as
suggested above, capitalises on single-item learning.
Enhanced production of regular past tense
verb endings in boys with HF-ASD (Walenski
et al., 2014) – A reinterpretation
Our interpretation of this ﬁnding is straightforward,
once it is accepted that procedural learning is intact in
people with ASD across the spectrum, whereas declara-
tive learning is partially impaired. In people with HF-
ASD, this would result in an unusual degree of reliance
on procedural learning and function, with enhanced
ability to generate regular past tense verb forms.
The accuracy of the HF-ASD participants’ responses
on tests of knowledge and use of irregular past tense
verb forms is consistent with their intact semantic
memory. However, in the previous subsection we sug-
gested that in people with HF-ASD there is a within
declarative memory see-saw eﬀect in that intact seman-
tic/single item memory is relied on to an unusual degree
to compensate for impaired episodic/relational
memory. We used this claim to explain speeded
naming. Assuming that the acquisition of irregular
past tense forms is also unusually dependent on intact
lexical-semantic learning it is logical to ask why the
ability to generate such forms was not also speeded.
We suggest that the explanation lies in diﬀerences
between substantive single-word vocabulary items
such as have a simple identiﬁcation function (as pro-
posed by Kelley et al., 2006), as opposed to vocabulary
items such as irregular past tense forms that do not
have this basic identiﬁcation function.
See-saw effects in ASD – A reformulation
As will be clear from preceding sections of this paper,
we agree with Ullman and Pullman (2015) that see-saw
Table 1. The four-system model of learning abilities in ASD, including the concept of a ‘see-saw’
effect of distinct compensatory learning systems in HF-ASD and LF-ASD.
UNEVEN LEARNING ABILITIES IN ASD
 Non-declarative/implicit systems Declarative/explicit systems 
Perceptual  
memory 
Procedural 
memory 
 Semantic  
memory 
Episodic 
memory 
HF-ASD Mainly intact 
(but primary sensory-perceptual anomalies 
impair category formation; and primary 
social deficits impair implicit social 
learning)
Intact Impaired 
See-saw 
effect
Used to 
compensate for 
impaired episodic 
memory 
LF-ASD Mainly intact 
(but primary sensory-perceptual anomalies 
impair category formation; and primary 
social deficits impair implicit social 
learning)
Impaired Impaired 
See-saw 
effect 
Used to compensate for across-the-board 
impairment of explicit learning
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eﬀects occur in people with ASD. However, as will also
be clear from preceding sections, we consider that the
claim that declarative memory compensates for impair-
ments of non-declarative/implicit learning in ASD is
inconsistent with the evidence.
Our view of where ‘see-saw’ eﬀects, i.e. compensa-
tory strategies, come into play in people with HF-ASD,
and also – diﬀerently – in people with LF-ASD is sum-
marised in Table 1.
We assume that intact learning systems (in green, in
Table 1) will be used where possible to compensate for
impaired systems (shown in red). On this assumption,
and consistent with points made in previous sections of
this paper, we argue that:
. In people with HF-ASD there is a within-declarative
memory see-saw eﬀect in which intact semantic
memory compensates for impaired episodic memory.
. Also in people with HF-ASD, non-declarative/impli-
cit learning is, overall, superior to declarative/expli-
cit learning, manifesting in a secondary see-saw
eﬀect in which non-declarative learning is better
practiced – and the products of this learning can
be accessed with greater facility – than the products
of declarative learning.
. In people with LF-ASD there is a see-saw eﬀect in
which non-declarative/implicit learning and know-
ledge is heavily relied on for all kinds of learning
and behaviour to compensate for an across-the-
board impairment of declarative/explicit learning
and knowledge. The see-saw eﬀect will be more
marked in those with severe deﬁcits in semantic
memory additional to impaired episodic memory,
than in those individuals with mild or moderate
semantic learning impairments.
The autism-related behaviours that Ullman and
Pullman seek to explain in terms of their formulation
of a see-saw eﬀect can be explained in terms of our
reformulation, as follows:
(i) Excessive reliance on formulaic language in people
with HF-ASD is consistent with an unusual degree
of dependence on lexical-semantic/single-item
learning in reaction to limited input from epi-
sodic/relational learning. Formulaic, or ‘stock’
phrases, constitute single items and, as such, are
easily acquired.
(ii) We agree with Ullman and Pullman that people
with HF-ASD – also those individuals with LF-
ASD whose semantic memory is only mildly or
moderately impaired – may beneﬁt from being
taught culture-appropriate social routines using
explicitly memorised rules, scripts and event sche-
mas. However, as argued above, this is not because
implicit learning is impaired, as claimed by Ullman
and Pullman, but because one or other of the gen-
etically hardwired social interaction propensities/
capacities on which unconscious acquisition of
social behaviours also depends are not available.
(iii) Nor is the use of explicit (conscious) problem sol-
ving to ‘hack out’ solutions to tests of theory of mind
attributable to impaired implicit learning per se,
but rather to genetically determined impairments
of one or more of the social propensities and capa-
cities underlying normal social learning. These pro-
pensities and capacities may constitute
prerequisites for the acquisition of mentalising
ability; however, the possibility that mentalising
ability is itself a genetically determined/prepro-
grammed capacity remains open (for discussion
see Frith, 2013; Happe & Frith, 2014).
(iv) Similarly, the use of consciously formulated rules to
establish categories and concepts is not attributable
to impaired implicit learning, but rather to the
peculiarities of sensory-perceptual processing in
ASD.
(v) Finally, Ullman and Pullman’s claim that thera-
peutic interventions rely on explicit teaching meth-
ods is something of a half-truth. We agree (see
above) that explicit instruction may be used to
teach higher-functioning autistic individuals ‘how
to behave’ socially. However, many psychosocial
and educational interventions commonly used
with people with ASD rely wholly or in part on
‘learning by doing’. An obvious example is the
‘TEACCH’ method a central tenet of which is to
establish patterns of behaviour by repetition, using
context-speciﬁc visual cues to support verbal
instruction. And learning by doing (using implicit
learning mechanisms) is essential to interventions
for those people with LF-ASD in whom there is a
total or near total lack of declarative learning abil-
ity, and little language. To give just one example:
functional use of the Picture Exchange
Communication System (Bondy & Frost, 2001;
Frost & Bondy, 2002, see review by Sulzer-
Azaroﬀ, Hoﬀman, Horton, Bondy & Frost, 2009)
is taught by a gradual process of behaviour train-
ing in which language and explicit teaching have a
negligible role.
Conclusion
We have argued that most of the views expressed by
Walenski, Ullman et al. concerning anomalies within
the learning systems underlying language abilities and
other capacities in ASD are incomplete or untenable.
We have gone into considerable detail in making this
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argument, not least because Ullman, the senior member
of this group, has a well-deserved reputation for his
work on language acquisition and language disorder
(especially as manifested in speciﬁc language impair-
ment and the aphasias). His work is inﬂuential, and if
his views on the nature and origins of language impair-
ment in ASD (and on the nature of the ‘see-saw’ eﬀect
as manifested in ASD) are not countered, they may lead
some researchers and also practitioners down blind
alleys. This would be greatly regrettable because the
combination of ASD plus clinically signiﬁcant language
impairment and learning disability is a multifaceted
load of ‘diﬀerence’, with heavy costs – emotional, prac-
tical and ﬁnancial – for aﬀected individuals and their
families, and lifetime ﬁnancial costs for States
(Boucher, 2017).
There is, unfortunately, lamentably little research
into the clinically signiﬁcant language and learning dis-
abilities that so commonly co-occur with ASD.7 The
lack of knowledge and understanding of these major
‘speciﬁers’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)
not only retards the development of rationale-based,
evidence-based interventions. It also retards research
into the etiological origins of these speciﬁers, such as
might eventually contribute to reducing their incidence
in association with ASD.
In the present paper, we have not only oﬀered an
evidence-based critique of Ullman et al.’s theoretical
papers and empirical studies of language in ASD. We
have also outlined our own alternative model of links
between language outcomes and the patterns of strength
and weakness that characterise learning and memory
across the spectrum. We are all too aware, nevertheless,
that there will be a need for revision and re-revision, as
and when more evidence becomes available.
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Notes
1. This widely used term is descriptive and has no officially
agreed definition, but generally refers to individuals with-
out clinically significant learning disability or language
impairment.
2. This descriptive term is generally used to apply to individ-
uals with ASD who have clinically significant learning and
language impairments.
3. Notably some of the earlier candidates for early manifest-
ing primary social impairments – for example social
orienting impairment – are now discounted (see, e.g.
Johnson (2014)).
4. We do not cover the role of working memory in the acqui-
sition of language by people with HF-ASD. This is not
because working memory does not have a role; but
rather that it is not centrally relevant to the discussion of
Ullman et al.’s findings, nor to discussion of any see-saw
effect relevant to language processing in HF-ASD.
5. The fact that generalisation occurs implicitly is incidental:
impaired generalisation is what almost certainly causes
impaired acquisition of categories and concepts, not the
fact that generalisation is an implicit process.
6. It is worth noting that Baron-Cohen et al.’s claims that
systemising is a peak ability in ASD supports our claim of
unimpaired procedural learning.
7. A literature search shows that between 2000 and 2017,
over 7500 papers with either ‘High-functioning autism/aut-
istic/ASD’ or ‘Asperger(s)’ in the title were published com-
pared with 174 papers with any of the terms ‘autism’/
autistic/ASD’ plus any of the qualifying terms or phrases
‘low(er)-functioning/retarded/language impaired/language
impairment/learning impaired/learning impairment/learn-
ing disabled/learning disability’ in their titles.
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